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“The Secretary-General should immediately proceed to establish an 
independent international mechanism (…).” The UN Panel of Experts on 
Accountability in Sri Lanka (March 2011).1 
1 Introduction 
The international community, especially non-governmental organizations (NGO)2 
and the Tamil diaspora3 are eager at the prospects of ‘delivering justice’ and 
‘ending impunity’ in Sri Lanka. One possibility is to create a new ad hoc or hybrid 
international criminal tribunal analogous to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or 
the Sierra Leone Special Court (SCSL).4 In her visit in August of 2013, Navi 
Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, pushed for 
some form of accountability for the civilian causalities from 27 years of conflict, 
especially during the lead up to the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
1 United Nations Secretary General’ Panel’s Report, Recommendation 1: Investigation (B): The 
Secretary General should immediately proceed to establish an independent international 
mechanism, whose mandate should include the following concurrent functions: 
(i) Monitor and assess the extent to which the Government of Sri Lanka is carrying out an 
effective domestic accountability process, including genuine investigations of the alleged 
violations, and periodically advise the Secretary-General on its findings; (ii) Conduct 
investigations independently into the alleged violations, having regard to genuine and effective 
domestic investigations; and (iii) Collect and safeguard for appropriate future use information 
provided to it, which is relevant to accountability for the final stages of the war, including the 
information gathered by the Panel and other bodies in the United Nations system; United Nations, 
UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (September 2011), 
SG/SM/13791 HR/5072. 
2Amnesty International, “Sri Lanka: Reconciliation at a crossroads: Continuing impunity, arbitrary 
detentions, torture and enforced disappearances: Amnesty International Submission to the UN 
Universal Periodic Review”, 1 April 2012; Amnesty International, No Real Will to Account: 
Shortcomings in Sri Lanka’s National Plan of Action to implement the recommendations of the 
LLRC, 30 August 2012, ASA 37/010/2012; International Crisis Group (ICG), Sri Lanka’s 
Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action, 20 February 2013, Asia Report N°243, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5124deb32.html; Human Rights Watch, "We Will 
Teach You a Lesson" - Sexual Violence against Tamils by Sri Lankan Security Forces, 26 
February 2013, ISBN: 1-56432-993-3, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5130850f2.html. 
3 For example see Kubes Navaratnam, “Post-conflict Sri Lanka needs Canadian R2P”, Embassy 
(28, 03, 2012); Vani Selvarajah, “Sri Lanka on notice: Where do we go from here?” (2013) 
Toronto Star; Harini Sivalingam,  "Canada can help Sri Lanka" The Sun (Jan 17, 2013); CTC, 
Statement at the Press Conference held at the Canadian Parliament on November 15, 2012, 
online < http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=74>; See also 
Center for War Victims and Human Rights, “War Victim Documentation” Project, online< 
http://www.cwvhr.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=55>.  
4 “While similar to the first generation tribunals in their organizational structure, subject matter 
jurisdiction and international legitimacy, mixed [hybrid] tribunals are distinguished from the former 
by their legal status, their mixed jurisdiction and composition and their funding mechanism”; 
Daphana Shraga, “Mixed or international Courts” in Antonio Cassese, ed., The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2009) at 424; Frederic Megret, “In 
Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of International Criminal Justice” (2005) 
38 Cornell International Law Journal. 
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(LTTE). These aspirations point to the possibility of indicting and prosecuting 
members of the current Sri Lankan regime and the remaining members of LTTE 
for potential war crimes and crimes against humanity charges.  
In this paper, I use the Panel’s recommendation to create an international 
mechanism and recent demands for justice as a springboard to argue that the 
creation of a new ad hoc international or hybrid criminal tribunal for Sri Lanka 
may not produce the expected results of prosecuting those responsible for mass 
human rights violations. Moreover I argue that such an initiative will not heal the 
ruptures and cleavages among the different ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. By 
teasing out the political nature of international criminal law and the embedded 
nature of the history of international law, this chapter suggests that the creation 
of an international institution may not bring to justice the divergent perpetrators of 
war crimes. Rather, the politics of international institutions and the history of 
international law may allow for ‘regulatory capture’5 and the continuing rise of 
international experts6 as seen through the illustrative history of the ICTR. This is 
counterproductive to the goals of creating an international institution to deliver 
justice to the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity. While 
international and hybrid institutions are theoretically distinct, I treat these two 
types of institutions as being similar in their effects.7 
The local Sri Lankan and international NGOs working in the North and East rely, 
within the context of the vacuous political space created by the defeat of the 
LTTE, on the international community and its potential power to influence and 
control the behavior of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). Some of local 
inhabitants believe that the international community has the potential to be their 
saviors.8 Inversely, pockets of the Tamil diaspora feeds off the narratives of 
victims as a means to fuel their nationalist agenda. The main challenge, 
however, is to critically examine the existing global governance9 mechanisms as 
a potential tool to bring those responsible for past mass atrocities and ongoing 
human rights violations, whilst moving forward by rebuilding the decimated Sri 
5 Walter Mattli and Ngaure Woods, ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global 
Politics’ in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) at 5. 
6 David Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance” (2005) 27 
Sydney Journal of International Law 8; Elena A Baylis, ‘Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict 
Justice Junkies” (2008) 10 Oregon Review of International Law 361. 
7 Tim Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge: CUP, 2009).  
8 Makau W. Mutua, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001) 
Harvard International Law Journal 42 (1) 201-245. 
9 Lawrence Finkelstein, "What Is Global Governance?" (1995) 1 (3) Global Governance pp. 367-
372; David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington 
Consensus (Polity, 2004); Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Leal Pluralism’ (2010) 1(2) 
Transnational Legal Theory 141. 
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Lankan society.10 A new fabric must be reconstituted that takes account of the 
ethnic and religious divides that have been exacerbated by 27 years of war.  
 
The protracted Sri Lankan ethnic conflict continues to this day, even though the 
GoSL defeated the LTTE, the Tamil secessionist movement. The continued 
discriminatory practices of the GoSL can be gleaned through its ongoing military 
occupation of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.11  The discriminatory 
practices started with the independence from British rule and these practices 
resulted in the secessionist sentiments.12 
 
The Panel’s recommendation calls for the establishment of an independent 
international mechanism to monitor the Sri Lankan Government’s initiation of 
accountability proceedings to investigate the alleged violations, and to collect 
evidence of past crimes. The recommendation does not suggest the utilization of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) or other transitional justice tools.13 These 
tools can include Truth Commissions or Commissions of Inquiry, for example. By 
taking stock of the Panel’s recommendation, I argue instead that the creation of a 
new international and/or hybrid institution through the investigation of alleged 
violations (and the collection of data for future use) may yield a whole host of 
other issues that are connected to the existing global politics and the history of 
international law.14 Whilst the UN Panel did not directly call for the creation of an 
ad hoc or hybrid international institution, there is implicit recognition that creating 
such a mechanism could monitor Sri Lanka’s initiation of accountability 
proceedings and collect evidence. The international community has often relied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Accountability and memory are some of the main tenets of transitional justice. See for example 
Claudio Corradetti, Philosophical Issues in Transitional Justice Theory: A (Provisional) Balance, 
Politica & Societa', Il Mulino, Bologna, 2/2013.   
11 ICG report on the impeachment; Human Rights Watch, "We Will Teach You a Lesson" - Sexual 
Violence against Tamils by Sri Lankan Security Forces, 26 February 2013, ISBN: 1-56432-993-3, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5130850f2.html; International Crisis Group 
(ICG), Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action, 20 February 2013, Asia 
Report N°243, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5124deb32.html; The Social 
Architects, “The Numbers Never Lie: A Comprehensive Assessment of Sri Lanka’s LLRC 
Progress”, March 2013, available at: http://cl.ly/0d0M1S2F3N3H. 
12 ICG report on the impeachment; Human Rights Watch, "We Will Teach You a Lesson" - Sexual 
Violence against Tamils by Sri Lankan Security Forces, 26 February 2013, ISBN: 1-56432-993-3, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5130850f2.html; International Crisis Group 
(ICG), Sri Lanka’s Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action, 20 February 2013, Asia 
Report N°243, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/5124deb32.html; The Social 
Architects, “The Numbers Never Lie: A Comprehensive Assessment of Sri Lanka’s LLRC 
Progress”, March 2013, available at: http://cl.ly/0d0M1S2F3N3H. 
13 United Nations, UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka 
(September 2011), SG/SM/13791 HR/5072, Recommendations 1B 
14 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Makau Mutua, “What is Twail?” (2000) 
American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting 31; Antony 
Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL: Comment’, (2000) 94 American Society of International Law `39; Obiora 
C. Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, 
or Both?’ (2010) 10 International Community Law Review 37. 
	  	   5	  
on such a process to start international criminal proceedings. For example, both 
the ad hoc tribunals were created based on similar recommendations and 
subsequent reports of the Commissions of Inquiry that were set up to investigate, 
monitor and collect evidence.15  
 
The political power of potential international prosecutions as a possible deterrent 
against current or former oppressive regime is understandable.16 Moreover, it is a 
potential catalyst to a transitional justice moment, in which post-authoritarian, 
post-communist, and post-conflict societies can transition from moments of acute 
crisis to moving forward through the prosecution of those responsible for human 
rights violations.17 There are numerous alternatives to the formalist responses in 
transitional justice, ranging from national prosecutions, truth commissions, 
sanctions, reparations, amnesties and pardons.18 The emphasis on the legalist 
push within these moments of transitions has been subject to incisive criticism 
and interrogation. Rama Mani has suggested that transitional justice should 
focus on the creation of a holistic future that incorporates the rebuilding of legal 
and social institutions with reparations for past crimes while simultaneously 
fostering distributive justice.19 Likewise, there are other interventions that trace 
the connection between law and development strategies and transitional 
justice.20 More recently, Vasuki Nesiah has noted that transitional justice tools 
have tended to emphasize accountability for past crimes through individual 
criminal responsibility for specific prohibited conduct and through the desire to 
move forward.21 Ultimately, therefore Nesiah argues that “transitional justice 
institutions […] may be better understood as having operated as official gate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Cherif Bassiouni, “United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security  
Council Resolution 780 (1992)” (1994) 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 784; Robert Cryer,  Prosecuting 
International Crimes: Selectivity and the International  Criminal Law Regime (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 52; Leila Nadaa Sadat, & Michael P Scharf, The Theory 
and Practice of International Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008); Roy Lee,  "The Rwanda Tribunal" (1996) 9 Leiden J. Int'l L 37 
at 2. 
16 Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University 
Press , 2012). 
17 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oup 2000); Ruti G. Teitel, “The Transitional Apology,” in 
Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, eds, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation 
Stanford University Press 2006); Paige Arthur, “How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A 
Conceptual History of Transitional Justice”, (2009) Human Rights Quarterly 2; Palmer, Nicola, 
Clark, Phil & Granville Danielle, Critical Perspectives in Transtional Justice (Intersentia, 2012).  
18 Jose Alvarez, “Alternatives to International Criminal Justice” in Antonio Cassese, ed., The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009);  
19 Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002).  
20 Rama Mani, ‘Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between 
Transitional Justice and Development’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 25. 
21 Vasuki Nesiah, “The Trials Of History: Losing Justice In The Monstrous And The Banal” in P 
Zumbansen and R Buchanan (eds) Law in Transition: Development, Rights and Transitional 
Justice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013).  
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keepers, privileging some histories and obscuring others.”22 This chapter builds 
on this literature to argue that groups advocating for post war accountability 
measures in Sri Lanka should consider turning away from the legalist model of 
international criminal institutions in favor of alternative, emancipatory tools for 
transitional justice.  
 
 The first part of this analysis sets out the intricate institutional landscape of 
international criminal institutions and then focus on the ICTR. The second section 
will draw broad claims from the ‘lived’ experience of these institutions and is 
largely based on my prior publications and my ongoing doctoral work. Based on 
historical examination, I contextualize the creation of ICTR within global 
governance discussions to argue that an international or hybrid tribunal for Sri 
Lanka may not deliver justice or end impunity. Thus, the focus should shift from 
the international to the local domestic,23 such that more emphasis is placed on 
building the local judiciary and legal profession, especially through existing NGO 
structures, in order to foster an environment that promotes access to justice, 
particularly for the victims of the war.  
2 Diverse Models of Delivering International Justice: International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The evolution of international law is embedded within an expansionist 
colonial history that arguably commenced with Treaty of Westphalia and the 
creation of the nation-state.24 The turn to international institutions25 is both 
admired26 and criticized27 for importing components of domestic legal regimes to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Vasuki Nesiah, “The Trials Of History: Losing Justice In The Monstrous And The Banal” in P 
Zumbansen and R Buchanan (eds) Law in Transition: Development, Rights and Transitional 
Justice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) at 21. 
23 See generally Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf, eds., Localizing Transitional Justice: 
Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence (SUP, 2010); Dustin N. Sharp “Addressing 
Dilemmas of the Global and the Local in Transitional Justice”, online< 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288853>  
24 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Martti Koskenniemi, "International Law and Raison D’Etat: 
Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law" in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, 
The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 297-361; Hauke Brunkhorst, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the 
World Society, in: Dobner & Loughlin (eds.), [see previous reference], 179-198. 
25 See generally David Kennedy,  “The Move to Institutions”, (1987) 8 Cardozo Law Review 841.  
26Jose E Alvarez, “Judging the Security Council” (1996) 90 Am. J. Int’l. L 1; Jean L. Cohen, “A 
Global State of Emergency or the Further Constitutionalization of International Law: A Pluralist 
Approach” (2008) 15 (4) Constellations  456; Neil Walker, “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic 
Grids:  The Global Disorder of Normative Orders” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 373.  
27M. S Sornarajah, “Power and Justice in International Law”, (1997) Singapore Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 28 at 32. There is a tangential discussion of the League of 
Nations’ failure.   
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the international sphere, for example, assemblies, tribunals, executives, and 
legislatures.28 Theorists are preoccupied with understanding and describing the 
ebbs and flows of international law through its process, actors and norms,29 using 
both domestic and plural conceptions of law, such as Global Administrative 
Law30; Global Constitutionalism31; Legal Pluralism32 and Transnational Legal 
Pluralism33.  International criminal law is one of the fastest growing fields in 
international law. International criminal institutions are part and parcel of the 
existing global governance regimes. The end of the Cold War precipitated the 
proliferation of international criminal justice institutions.34 Numerous international 
and hybrid or mixed criminal institutions have been created in the last twenty 
years, including the permanent International Criminal Court.35  
 
 The sui generis tribunals (ICTR and ICTY) are the direct descendants of the 
International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East.36 The 60 year long gap between the prosecution of 
those responsible for the commission of war crimes during World War II and the 
international prosecution of war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 John Charney,  “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?” (1998) 
271 Recueil des cours 101; Carsten Stahn,  “Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: On 
experiments and imperfections”, in G. Sluiter (ed.), International Criminal Procedure (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 123-126. 
29Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law, Evolving” in J. M. Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2012).  
30 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15; Nico Krisch and Benedict 
Kingsbury, “Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International 
Legal order” (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 1; Benedict Kingsbury, “The 
Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance” (2005) ASIL Proceedings 143; Benedict 
Kingsbury, “The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law” (2009) 20(1) European Journal 
of International Law 23. 
31 Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir  
Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Ronald St. John Macdonald & D M Johnston, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the 
Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus Nihjoff, 2005); Alec Stone Sweet, 
‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes’, (2009) 16  (2) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 621; But see Jose E. Alvarez, "The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and 
Consequences" (2003) 38 (3) TexILJ 421 
32 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (CUP, 2012). 
33 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Leal Pluralism’ (2010) 1(2) Transnational Legal Theory 141. 
34 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-five Years: the Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court” (1997) 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 11 at 39. 
35 International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993); International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994); Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, 2002); International 
Criminal Court (2002). There are however nine such institutions in total. The other five are: 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, 2007); Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(2007); ‘Regulation 64’ Panels (2000); Iraqi High Tribunal (formerly Iraqi Special Tribunal) and; 
East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes (2000-2005. 
36 Alexander  Zahar & Goran Sluiter, International Criminal Law; A Critical Introduction (Oxford: 
OUP, 2009) at 6. 
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largely credited to the politics of the Cold War. It is often remarked that one of the 
casualties of the Cold War was the desire to prosecute those responsible for 
mass human atrocities,37 as the international community could not agree on how 
to prosecute and who to prosecute.   
 
Successful campaigns by the international human rights activists and the 
proliferation in international criminal justice mechanisms have ushered in 
numerous prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of human rights violations at the 
national level. Domestically, there are numerous universal jurisdiction-based 
cases from several countries.38 The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
into domestic criminal law bolsters the drive to prosecute alleged perpetrators of 
war crimes at the domestic level. The Canadian case against Désiré Munyaneza 
is an illustrative example:39 a Rwanda Hutu militia member was prosecuted by 
the Canadian government on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide, using the domestic implementation act of the Rome Statute.40 
More recently, South Africa has decided to investigate the commission of rape 
during the 2009 elections in Zimbabwe under the leadership of President 
Mugabe.41  
 
In what follows, both ICTR and ICTY will be presented, showcasing how they 
were created and how they operate, before delving into the mechanics of the 
ICTR. 
2.1 Sui Generis International Institutions:  
 
ICTY and ICTR42 were the first international criminal institutions to be established 
by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) through its Chapter VII Charter 
powers to maintain peace and security.43 The purpose of these institutions, as 
set out in their respective enabling UN Resolutions is: (i) to bring to justice 
persons allegedly responsible for the violation of international humanitarian law, 
(ii) to render justice to the victims, (iii) to deter future crimes and, (iv) to restore 
peace by ending impunity.44  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-five Years: the Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court” (1997) 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 11 at 39. 
38 Lorna McGregor, “Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty” 
(2008) 18 E.J.I.L. 903; Craig Forcese, “De-Immunizing Torture: Reconciling Human Rights and 
State Immunity” (2007) 52 McGill L.J. 127 
39 R. v. Munyaneza [2009] QCCA 2326.  
40Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000, c. 24). 
41 Geoffry York, Globe and Mail, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-ground-
breaking-move-s-africa-steps-in-over-alleged-zimbabwe-mass-rapes/article9016480/> 
42 The Rwandan tribunal shares the appeal chamber and the prosecutor with ICTY; Roy Lee, 
"The Rwanda Tribunal" (1996) 9 Leiden J. Int'l L 37. 
43 United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 39 A.J.I.L. 190 Supp, (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
44 Sarah Williams, “ICTY and ICTR (Completion Strategy)” in Antonio Cassese ed., Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at 362-363. 
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It is impossible to examine the ICTR without taking stock of the ICTY, since they 
have analogous histories and share many similarities. Both institutions are 
temporary, and therefore, the judges of the tribunals initiated completion 
strategies in 2003 (ICTR) and 2004 (ICTY),45 providing deadlines by which point 
the tribunals are expected to ensure that they could complete their cases. ICTY 
is set to deliver its final judgment sometime 2014, while the ICTR has already 
delivered its final Trial level decision.  
 
Both institutions have also adopted a policy of strengthening their respective 
national judicial systems. For instance, the ICTY has been a catalyst in setting up 
war crimes chambers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia with the 
support of the UN Security Council. These local chambers focus on the 
intermediate and lower-level officials accused of committing serious human rights 
violations and are part of ICTY’s completion strategy. Similarly, the Rwandan 
courts and Gacaca courts are in the process of prosecuting intermediate and 
lower-level officials. The Gacaca courts are the domestic local courts used to 
prosecute those suspected of having participated in the Rwandan Genocide in 
1996. These courts exist and function parallel with the regular courts. 46 
 
In 1992, the UNSC requested the UN Secretary General to establish an 
“impartial” Commission of Experts (COE) to examine, analyse, and provide 
“conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”.47 In its first interim report, the 
COE concluded that grave breaches and other violations of international 
humanitarian law had been committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.48 The 
COE’s work however, was marred with difficulties, particularly because of the 
allocation of resources.  
 
With the submission of the first interim report by the COE,49 the UNSC decided to 
prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes, by creating the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45See  ICTR/ICTY Completion Strategy; Sarah Williams, “ICTY and ICTR (Completion Strategy)” 
in Antonio Cassese ed., Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 
at 362-363. 
46 The Gacaca court is the domestic local court used to prosecute those suspected of having 
participated in the Rwandan Genocide in 1996. These courts exist and function parallel with the 
regular courts.  Cecile Aptel, “Gacaca courts” in Antonio Cassese ed., Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2009) at 330. 
47 UNSCOR, 3119th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 780 S/RES/780 (1992) ; 15 yes and 0 
No/Abstentions, non-permanent members: Austria, Belgium, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Hungry, 
India, Japan, Morocco, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
48 UNSCOR, Report of Secretary General, S/1994/674 (1994) at para 10 
49M. Cherif Bassiouni, “United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992)” (1994) 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 784 
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Yugoslavia on May 27 1992, relying on its UN Chapter VII Charter powers (to 
maintain peace and security).50  
 
In 1994, the UNSC established a Commission of Experts to investigate the 
atrocities committed during the Rwandan genocide between January 1994 and 
December 1994.51 According to the COE’s final October 1994 report, “[S]ince 6 
April 1994, an estimated 500,000 unarmed civilians have been murdered in 
Rwanda”.52 There was some concern about whether Rwanda was an 
international or non-international conflict. The COE report clearly adopted a 
position that it was not an international armed conflict.53 The involvement of the 
international peacekeeping force, led by Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, and 
the role of the neighbouring countries throws these claims into doubt. The 
severity of the atrocities precipitated the UNSC to utilize its Charter powers to set 
up the Tribunal. The creation of a special mechanism for Sri Lanka will 
undoubtedly have to confront the very nature of the civil war between the LTTE 
and the Sri Lankan forces. If the Sri Lankan conflict is deemed to be a non-
international armed conflict, the legal thresholds that would apply are holly 
different from those ascribed to be international armed conflict.  
 
The ICTY Statute has 34 provisions and the ICTR Statute has 32 provisions that 
delineate the international crimes, the organizational structure, and the 
composition of the tribunal.54 The statutes set out four clusters of punishable 
crimes: genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity55. The judges of the tribunals were given the power 
to draft and adopt rules of procedure and evidence.56 These powers are 
controversial because they have resulted in giving the judges quasi-legislative 
powers within the tribunals.57 Some may conclude that a similar international 
mechanism could be the most useful in dealing with the 27 year conflict in Sri 
Lanka and support the process of healing by prosecuting those responsible for 
mass human rights violations.58 On the other hand, scholars have sought to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 827, S/RES/827 (1993) [ICTY Statute]; 15 Yes, 0 
No/Abstentions, non-permanent members: Argentina, Brazil, Czech Republic, Djibouti, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda and Spain.  
51 See generally Leila Nadaa Sadat & Michael P. Scharf, The Theory and Practice of International 
Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). 
52 UNSCOR, Report of Secretary General, S/1994/1125  (1994) at para 43. 
53 UNSCOR, Report of Secretary General, S/1994/1125  (1994) at para 91. 
54 UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 827, S/RES/827 (1993). 
55 Article 2, 3 and 4, UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 827, S/RES/827 (1993). 
56 Article 15, UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 827, S/RES/827 (1993). 
57 Decision on the Communications between the Parties and their Witness, Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY.. 58	  For example see Kubes Navaratnam, “Post-conflict Sri Lanka needs Canadian R2P”, Embassy 
(28, 03, 2012); Vani Selvarajah, “Sri Lanka on notice: Where do we go from here?” (2013) 
Toronto Star; Harini Sivalingam,  "Canada can help Sri Lanka" The Sun (Jan 17, 2013); CTC, 
Statement at the Press Conference held at the Canadian Parliament on November 15, 2012, 
online < http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=74>; See also 	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interrogate the formalism embedded in the structure of international law and its 
potential to deliver justice.  
 
In the late 1800s and 1900s, American legal realist critique, inspired by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ canonical Path of Law, destabilised traditional understandings 
of law.59  Scholars like Holmes and Wesley Hohfeld wanted to question the very 
foundation of formal structures of law.60 Roscoe Pound’s helpful 19th century 
insight indicting international law as a “social end” and his condemnation of the 
preoccupation with abstract international law rules pushed scholars to re-imagine 
existing discourses.61  More contemporary versions of the realist critique have 
emerged.62 Building on the writings of Holmes, the legal realists wanted to 
replace formalism with “a pragmatic attitude toward law generally” and they 
believed that law “was made, not found”.63 Scholars were attuned to how judicial 
decisions were created, reflecting on the socio-political context of these 
decisions, as opposed to accepting that judicial decisions were the “outcome of 
reasoning from a finite set of determinate principles”.64 To better understand how 
law functions in the real world, the realists sought to combine law with social 
science and subsequently viewed law as a social science. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Center for War Victims and Human Rights, “War Victim Documentation” Project, online< 
http://www.cwvhr.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=55>.	  
59 Oliver Wendel Holmes,  “ The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 
60 David Kennedy & William Fisher III, “Introduction” in Kennedy, David & Fisher,  
William III, The  Cannon of American Legal Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2006) at 3; Oliver Wendel Holmes,  “ The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457; Wesley 
Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 
Yale Law Journal 16. 
61 Roscoe Pound, “Philosophical Theory and International Law”, (1923) Bibliotkeca Visseiana  
1-90; Manley Hudson, "The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century" (1925) 4 
Cornell Law Quarterly 419 at 421; Marti Koskenniemi, "The Politics of International Law" (1990) 1 
E.J.I.L. 4 at 8. 
62 Victoria Nourse & Shaffer, Gregory. “Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can A  New World Order 
Prompt A Legal Theory?”  (2009) 95 Cornell Law Review 61 at 65; Miles,  Thomas J. and 
Sunstein, Cass R.  “The New Legal Realism” U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working 
Paper No. 372 U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 191 at 2; Makau Mutua, “What is 
Twail?” (2000) A.S.I.L, Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting 31.; Antony Anghie, ‘What is 
TWAIL: Comment’, (2000) 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.  39.; Obiora C. Okafor,  ‘Critical Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?’ (2010) 10 International 
Community Law Review 37.; Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, “A Bibliography of Critical Legal 
Studies” (1984)  94 Yale L.J. 435; Joseph Singer, “Legal realism Now” (1998) 76 (2) California 
Law review 465 at  474; David Kairys  ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York:  
Pantheon Books, 1998). 
63 H Oliver Wendel Holmes,  “ The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457; Joseph Singer, 
“Legal realism Now” (1998) 76 (2) California Law review 465 at 474. 
64 Livingston, Debra 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal 
Scholarship (Note), 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669 (1982) at 1670. 
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This realist vernacular is now part of our understanding of international law and 
its doctrines, impacting both legal scholarship and lawyering,65 by “fundamentally 
alter[ing] our conceptions of legal reasoning and the relationship between law 
and society”.66  
 
This method has been described as “the most important indigenous 
jurisprudential movement in the United States”.67 Legal realism has led to the 
emergence of critical legal studies,68 feminist legal theory69, critical race theory,70 
and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)71.  Drawing inspiration 
from these scholarly interventions and my own experience of working within the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTR and ICTY72 and working in the North and East of 
Sri Lanka and Occupied Palestinian Territories, the following section will take a 
critical look at how the ICTR functions. I provide such an account to reveal the 
underbelly of the cosmopolitan international justice project and to demonstrate 
why an international mechanism similar to the two ad hoc tribunals or a hybrid 
institution may not be the best option to deliver justice to those affected by the 
conflict in Sri Lanka. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, “A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies” (1984)  94 Yale L.J. 
435 
66 Joseph Singer, “Legal realism Now” (1998) 76 (2) California Law review 465 at 467. 
67 Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism" in W. Edmundson and M. Golding eds.  
2nd edition, The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, edited  
(Maiden:Blackwell, 2005)  at 50. 
68 Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, “A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies” (1984)  94 Yale L.J. 
435 
69Mae C. Quinn, “Feminist Legal Realism” , Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, Vol. 35, No. 1, 
2012; Mari Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, (1990) 
43 Stanford Law Review, 1183-1192. 
70 Richard Delgado, “The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature” 
(1984) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 132; Patricia J Williams, Alchemy of Race 
and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard University Press, 1991), at 146-166 
71 Makau Mutua, “What is Twail?” (2000) A.S.I.L, Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting 31.; 
Antony Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL: Comment’, (2000) 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc.  39.; Obiora C. 
Okafor,  ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or 
Both?’ (2010) 10 International Community Law Review 37.; Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, “A 
Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies” (1984)  94 Yale L.J. 435; Joseph Singer, “Legal realism 
Now” (1998) 76 (2) California Law review 465 at  474; David Kairys  ed., The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1998) 
72 Legal Intern to Judge Agius, Vice President ICTY/ICTR (April to August 2011); Legal Intern, Al 
Haq (April to August 2009); Documentation Desk Program Officer, Home for Human Rights 
(1999-2001); Ad Hoc Legal Advisor, Home For Human Rights (2004-2012); International 
Consultant and ICL Trainer, Home for Human Rights (2012-2013). . 
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3 Situating the Cultural Local: International Criminal Justice and Witness 
Testimony73 	  
Recent interdisciplinary accounts reveal divergent descriptions of how 
international criminal institutions function. What emerges from the socio-legal and 
anthropological studies of these institutions is in stark contrast to the push for 
accountability through the legitimate prosecution of those responsible for war 
crimes. Therefore, I present the lived reality74 of the ICTR as challenge to the 
mainstream assumption75 that international criminal trials “have at least been 
considered useful mechanisms for determining who did what to whom during a 
mass atrocity”.76 I use Nancy Combs’ empirical evidence from ICTR to argue that 
the creation of an ad hoc international mechanism is not the best option to 
”deliver justice and provide accountability” to the victims of mass human rights 
violations in Sri Lanka. In fact, the turn to the international is rather misplaced 
and misguided. I make these assertions based on the culture in which 
international criminal institutions operate.77 The inability of the witnesses to 
accurately convey their stories to the prosecutors and the judges is the bedrock 
of the analysis below. This inability stems from the specific culture of Rwanda 
and its colonial past.78 Sri Lanka too has a similar colonial past. Moreover 
Western understandings of how to conduct investigations and trials are 
superimposed through the adjudicatory process. This may elicit witness 
testimony that diverges from local customs and conceptions.79 This claim 
therefore is premised on the role of the judges and the employees of the tribunals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The following analysis is derived from my ongoing doctoral research and portions of this 
research have been published; see for example, Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance 
Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” (2012) 3(3) TLT 268; Sujith Xavier, Book Review, 
Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Border, Paul Schiff Berman (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 74	  Patricia J Williams, Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard University 
Press, 1991)	  75	  For example see Kubes Navaratnam, “Post-conflict Sri Lanka needs Canadian R2P”, Embassy 
(28, 03, 2012); Vani Selvarajah, “Sri Lanka on notice: Where do we go from here?” (2013) 
Toronto Star; Harini Sivalingam,  "Canada can help Sri Lanka" The Sun (Jan 17, 2013); CTC, 
Statement at the Press Conference held at the Canadian Parliament on November 15, 2012, 
online < http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=74>; See also 
Center for War Victims and Human Rights, “War Victim Documentation” Project, online< 
http://www.cwvhr.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=55>	  
76 Combs, 2010 at 4. 
77 This argument is drawn from my doctoral thesis. See also Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global 
Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” (2012) 3(3) TLT 268; Sujith Xavier, 
Book Review, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Border, Paul Schiff 
Berman (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
78 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Cambridge University Press, 2002).. 
79 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010).. 
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(experts), and how this expertise is created in these institutions. I draw on my 
previous assertions elsewhere and my on-going doctoral research.80    
 
My arguments are based on the culture context in which international criminal 
institutions operate.81 The witnesses’ inability to accurately convey their stories to 
the prosecutors and the judges is the basis of the forthcoming analysis below. I 
argue that this inability to relay the events is rooted in the specific culture of 
Rwanda and its colonial past.82 Importantly the Western experiences of how to 
conduct investigations and trials are superimposed through the adjudicatory 
process. Such a superimposition elicits witness testimony that may seem at odds 
with and diverges from the local customs and conceptions of justice of the local 
population.83 The central argument therefore is based on the role of the judges, 
the employees of the tribunals (experts) and how expertise is created in these 
institutions. I examine the implications of culture vis-à-vis international criminal 
justice within ICTR to illustrate the difficulties of such a model for accountability in 
post-war Sri Lanka.  
 
3.1 ICTR:	  Faulty	  Witness	  Testimony	  	  
Nancy Combs' study examines three tribunals with remarkably diverse histories. 
She reviews the transcripts of witness testimony from the ICTR, SCSL, and the 
East Timor Special Panels.84 Each tribunal is extraordinary in the manner in 
which it was created and its respective criminal and temporal jurisdictions.85 She 
refutes assumptions that international criminal prosecutions will be able to 
determine who did what to whom, by highlighting the problematic nature of 
witness testimonies before these tribunals. She points to a significant hurdle that 
has plagued these three institutions: reveals a disjuncture between the evidence 
provided by the witnesses and the adjudicatory process undertaken by the 
tribunals.   
 
Combs states, Trial Chambers “often seem content to base convictions on highly 
problematic witness testimony,” with the result that it fails to find “reasonable 
doubt in some of the most doubtful instances and as a consequence, convict just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” 
(2012) 3(3) TLT 268; Sujith Xavier, Book Review, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law 
Beyond Border, Paul Schiff Berman (Cambridge University Press, 2012).	  
81 This argument is drawn from my doctoral thesis. See also Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global 
Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” (2012) 3(3) TLT 268; Sujith Xavier, 
Book Review, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Border, Paul Schiff 
Berman (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
82 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Cambridge University Press, 2002).. 
83 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010).. 
84Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010). at 4. 
85 ICTY & ICTR Statutes. 
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about every defendant who comes before them”.86 Of particular interest, Combs 
demonstrates that witnesses often cannot provide detailed account of the dates, 
the times, and the specific location of the events, or more importantly, accurately 
place the perpetrator at the scene of the crime.87  
 
These discrepancies are the result of educational, cultural, and translation-
related factors. This aligns with the research on domestic criminal prosecutions. 
Witnesses called in to testify are expected to provide a detailed account of who 
did what to whom. Criminal law scholars, who have identified witness testimony 
as deeply flawed based on numerous insights, flowing from critical race theory, 
feminism, and disability studies perspectives.88 Yet these interventions about the 
unreliability of witness testimony have not yet made their way into international 
criminal law.  
 
Instead, international criminal law debates have primarily focused on the 
substantive legality of international criminal adjudication.89 There are numerous 
accounts of the problematic features of institutional practices from defence 
counsel90 and academics with specific institutional knowledge of international 
mechanisms,91 and interdisciplinary insights from political scientists and 
anthropologists.92 Nonetheless the focus on the mechanics of the institutions, 
especially as they relate to international criminal procedure, is minimal.93 While 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 222; Importantly, 
Combs suggests that the judges are not “convicting innocent defendants”. “What I am suggesting, 
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there are different requests to incorporate diversity into the current framework94 
or criticisms of the problematic nature of admitting faulty evidence,95 there is little 
attention paid to the critical insights emerging from domestic criminal jurisdictions 
with regard to witness testimony. The rationale is two fold. 
 
First, the Nuremberg Tribunal Prosecutors relied on documents prepared by Nazi 
officials to establish guilt. ICTR prosecutors, however, rely exclusively on witness 
testimony.96 Contemporary international criminals, especially those in front of the 
ICTR, did not leave a trail of documentary evidence that could be used by the 
ICTR prosecutors.97 Rather, the perpetrators of the genocide relied other forms 
of communication.   
 
Second, the Rules of Evidence and Procedure (REP) of the ad hoc tribunals 
were drafted and amended by the judges, prosecutors, and other officials of the 
tribunals. The debates have therefore focused on the institutional and meritorious 
aspects of the REP and the degree to which common law and civil law traditions 
have influenced the development of these rules.98 Ultimately, critical insight 
regarding the questionable usefulness of witness testimony, gathered in the 
domestic context, was left out or totally ignored. The role of experts in this 
development is significant. 
   
Moving back to the specifics of the Rwandan Tribunal, even though ICTR 
witnesses know for a fact that the Rwandan President’s plane was shot down on 
6 April 1994, precipitating the genocide, they are not able to place perpetrators of 
the genocide at the scene of the crime on a specific date. The rationale is 
cultural. Some witnesses cannot convey events based on the Western calendar 
or lack formal Western-style education to respond to questions about specific 
dates and times. The prosecutors and most international staff conducting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Jessica Almqvist, ‘The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal Proceedings’ 
(2006) 4(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 745. 
95 Alexander Zahar, ‘The Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’ in André Klip and Göran Sluiter (eds), Annotated Leading Cases of International 
Criminal Tribunals Vol 25: International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda (Intersentia, 2006) 509.  
96 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 6. 97	  Sujith Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Ladeur” 
(2012) 3(3) TLT 268 at 279.	  
98 Gabrielle K McDonald, ‘Trial Procedures and Practices’ in Gabrielle K McDonald and Olivia 
Swaak-Goldman (eds), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The 
Experience of International and National Courts (Kluwer, 2000); Fausto Pocar, ‘Common and 
Civil Law Traditions in the ICTY Criminal Procedure: Does Oil Blend with Water?’ in Janet Walker 
and Oscar G Chase (eds), Common Law, Civil Law and the Future of Categories (LexisNexis, 
2010); Patrick L Robinson, ‘The Interaction of Legal Systems in the Work of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2009)16 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 5. 
	  	   17	  
investigations, trials and legal research are Western.99 For example, it important 
to determine whether the accused was present at the scene of the crime and 
whether the witnesses saw the perpetrator. Witnesses at times cannot determine 
the exact date or the month of the incident and therefore they cannot place the 
accused at the scene of the crime. Witnesses use cultural practices to identify 
events such as the seasons to determine the time of year. These practices are 
culturally specific and contingent. The notion of temporality or temporal 
sequences of events is another issue of contention, where witnesses are unable 
to provide the exact chronology in which the alleged incitement to genocide 
occurred. Meanwhile, the prosecutors and most international staff conducting the 
investigations, trials, and legal research are Western.100  
 
The judges have accepted “faulty witness testimonies” for compelling reasons. In 
light of their political affiliations, it is assumed that the accused perpetrators were 
involved in the genocide. This serves as the central basis for their conviction.101 
The judges rely on these factors to believe the witness testimonies. The ICTR 
has an 85 per cent conviction rate, which supports Combs’ assertions. Even 
when there are inconsistencies in the witness testimony, Combs notes that the 
‘[T]rial Chambers explain these away as products of the passage of time, the 
frailty of memory and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters’.102  
 
Taking a broader perspective, the adjudicatory process followed by these 
tribunals is based on western common law (adversarial) and civil law 
(inquisitorial) traditions.103 The common law tradition relies heavily on witness 
testimony and the judges (and the Tribunal as whole) have adopted these as the 
modus operandi.104 By using the western trial process, ‘international criminal 
proceedings cloak themselves in the form’s garb of fact-finding competence, but 
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it is only a cloak, for many of the key assumptions that underlie the Western trial 
form do not exist in the international context’.105  
 
The UNSC enabled the judges of the Tribunals to draft (and amend) their own 
respective rules of evidence and procedure. This may have provided them with 
perfect tool to resolve any outstanding problems. The very design of the trial 
process, and even pre-trial investigation, was left up to the judges of the tribunals 
to determine as they saw fit.106  In light of these conclusions, arguably there is a 
disconnect between the witness testimony evidence and the mandate to 
prosecute those with the gravest responsibility for the mass human rights 
violations and respecting the rights of the accused to due process.  
 
The Judges made amendments to the rules that were precipitated by the need 
for efficiency and expeditious trials without running up the costs of international 
justice. This pro-conviction bias of the judges may possibly stem from their 
personal background and their expertise.107 Within the Rwandan context, political 
affiliations signal to the tribunals the potential culpability of the accused. These 
factors ultimately lend support to the belief that the accused participated in the 
genocide, even without the ‘beyond-reasonable-doubt’ threshold given the faulty 
witness testimonies. The pro-conviction bias of the judges may possibly stem 
from their personal background and their expertise. 
 
3.2 Post-Conflict Justice Junkies and the Role of Expertise   
The individuals that staff these tribunals are crucial, particularly the judges and 
the respective employees of the tribunals’ different organs. Judges are selected 
through the United Nations and approved by the UNSC. More importantly, given 
the scarcity of practical expertise in international criminal law, judges move from 
one tribunal to the next, given international criminal law’s scarcity of expertise.108 
The judges rely on the expertise of international employees to conduct legal 
research and conduct the affairs of the tribunals.109  Employees of the United 
Nations, from judges to legal clerks to prosecution attorneys to in-house 
translators) populate the different departments and organs of the tribunals. In this 
regard, Elana Baylis has coined the phrase “post-conflict justice junkies” to 
describe the international staff who work on “post-conflict justice issues and who 
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maintain an itinerant lifestyle in pursuit of that work”. 110  The employees move 
from one hot spot to another within these tribunals.111  
 
Baylis relies on her personal experience to tell the story of young aspiring 
internationals engaged in trying to ‘make a difference’ by transferring their social 
activist legal (and other) training from western institutions to conflict hotspots and 
international criminal institutions.112 These good intentions, however, are clouded 
by what Baylis demonstrates as the ‘known unknowns’. These known unknowns 
are characterized as the “lack of local knowledge of post-conflict settings, 
whether that is knowledge of the local legal system, local facts, local culture or 
any other relevant information”.113 She argues that these known unknowns are 
notoriously hard to deal with due to lack of timing, false expertise, complexity and 
geographic size of the local context. False expertise then emerges from the 
nature of the work that is undertaken and the ability to transfer skills to other 
hotspots. These international “experts” spend no more than two to three years at 
each tribunal as they follow the “spread of international criminal justice.”114  The 
role of experts, unlike how it is presented within the institutions, is not value-
neutral. Their roles can be challenged using different perspectives, ranging from 
anthropology,115 sociology116 to history117. For the current purpose, it is important 
to reflect on how these issues relate to the creation of an international 
mechanism for Sri Lanka.    
 
 David Kennedy’s insights suggest that background norms of institutions 
are more important to global governance than originally thought.118 The political 
values of experts within the tribunals shape the tribunals’ outcomes. The experts 
manage the background norms that permeate the value structure of the tribunals.  
As Kennedy has highlighted, what really matters at the global governance level is 
not what is in the foreground, the tribunals, or the context, Rwanda or Sri Lanka, 	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for that matter. Rather, Kennedy argues that the background experts have 
“colonized the foreground and the context. In that the experts determine the 
contents of the foreground and the context. The foreground increasingly seems a 
mere spectacle — a performance to which we attribute agency, interest and 
ideology”. Simultaneously, it is difficult to “locate elements of context, which are 
not constructed by people managing background norms and institutions”.  
Kennedy argues that “foreground and the context may well turn out to be effects 
of background practices”.119  
 
It matters that judges and experts have a pro-conviction bias, which may 
inherently be rooted in manner in which international law was historically 
constructed.120 This bias has a detrimental effect on those who want to uphold 
justice through international criminal institutions. The role of the experts within 
these institutions, therefore, is not susceptible to the types of control expected in 
domestic administrative law or criminal law.121 Ultimately, cultural factors, such 
as the level of education of the witnesses and their cultural background, the role 
of the experts, the nature of their expertise, and their relationship to the judges 
essentially determine the way these institutions function and deliver legal 
decisions. These cultural factors in turn relay the truths in which these institutions 
operate, as opposed to the facts. 
4 Looking	  for	  Justice	  in	  the	  Wrong	  Places?	  Accountability	  and	  
Impunity	  in	  the	  Protracted	  Sri	  Lankan	  Conflict	  	  	  
The history of international law has often shown discrepancies between 
cosmopolitan ideals and on-the-ground realities.122 In the 16th century, Grotius’ 
attempts to curtail the raw power of the sovereign by creating new rules in the 
form of international law may be the ideal method of solving inter-state conflict.123 	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International law was used nonetheless to regulate the colonial encounter 
between local inhabitants of the new world and European colonizers.124 The  
development of international law in the 17th and 18th centuries was closely 
connected to colonialism and imperialism.125   By the late 19th and 20th centuries, 
the accelerated drive of international law had resulted in an abundance of 
international institutions that were instituted to deliver aid, regulate finances, and 
monitor waterways. In this regard, the creation of the new international criminal 
institutions is symptomatic of an established practice of creating international 
institutions to deal with global problems.  
 
The possibility of deterrence through international criminal justice is significant, 
especially given the GoSL’s total disregard for the applicability of the rule of law 
and established international standards.126 That said, and recognizing the duality 
of victim and savior127, the above analysis points to a significant challenge in 
pushing for an internationalist agenda in “delivering justice” in the transitional 
moment, especially through an international mechanism.128  
 
Nonetheless, the existing tools for grappling with transitions, especially when 
addressing mass human rights violations, are limited and often encapsulated 
within the truth vs. justice paradigm, or commissions vs. courts, debate.129 
Evidence of success from international and hybrid institutions is weak. As 
scholars debate the merits of international justice, a growing body of literature 
challenges the role courts play in delivering justice.130  The evidence of success 	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from Commissions of Inquiries and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 
especially South Africa and Canada, seem) have similar pitfalls as international 
courts. They too are susceptible to politics, similar to what was illustrated in the 
previous section.131 What then are the alternatives for a plural and diverse 
society that has been ravaged by conflict, such as Sri Lanka? I now briefly sketch 
out a rudimentary potential transitional justice plan for Sri Lanka.132   
 
The alternatives are located in Sri Lanka’s past, present, and future. Sri Lanka 
does not operate within a political vacuum. Its recent move to a middle-income 
country status is significant, as it demonstrates the country has a fast-developing 
economy that has joined the rest of the region in experiencing profound 
economic growth.133  Additionally, Sri Lanka has a rich history, albeit  described 
as problematic, in tackling past atrocities through Presidential Commissions of 
Inquiry.134 Whether successful or an utter failure, these Commissions provide an 
existing domestic framework that can be drawn upon, which has been deployed 
in the past.135  To build on the existing tents of the transitional justice literature, 
the alternatives available to confront human causalities during the conflict must 
be multifaceted and diverse.136 I employ an access to justice approach in dealing 
with mass human right violations. In doing so, I invoke the important contributions 
of Professor Ronald MacDonald,137 who suggests that an access to justice 
approach brings to the center a multidimensional strategy. Such a strategy “must 
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be pluralistic and embrace all the sites where law is made, administered and 
enforced”.138  
 
In light of the politics of contemporary Sri Lanka, such an invocation may not be 
conducive to the realities of the day, given the GOSL’s current position on post 
war reconciliation. Nonetheless, keeping with the theme of this volume as part of 
a moment in post-war Sri Lanka, an attempt must be made to imagine new 
possibilities. I suggest that an access to justice model will open up new vistas for 
different interest holders, especially victims of war crimes. I imagine an access to 
justice model to be a turn towards truth claims, blended with justice claims about 
the past, the present, and future, where those who were affected and those who 
continue to be affected, can come to terms with their emotional trauma through 
institutional recognition of the truth, delivery of some form of institutional justice, 
and socio-political outcomes that result in systemic change. I adopt such an 
approach cautiously, taking stock of and reflecting on the contributions from law 
and development over the years.139 
 
4.1 Access to Justice 
Current characterizations of access to justice suggest there are constant 
shifts in relativizing law’s formality. Starting in the 1960s, there has been an 
emphasis on law’s formalism and a turning away from the nation state’s 
monopoly on making laws.140 Particularly in North America, the political context, 
inspired by feminist141, civil rights142 and international human rights movements, 
such as those referred to earlier143, warrant a radicalization of law. Thus, we saw 
the development of progressive lawyering through the emergence of practicing 
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law for “poor people”.144 In Canada, in particular ,the development of access to 
justice has been understood in terms of temporal sequencing. The first wave of 
access to justice reforms addressed access to courts and lawyers, such that its 
focus was on the costs, delays, and complexity of the legal system.145 The 
second wave honed in on legal aid and institutional restructuring. The third wave 
emphasized access to justice as an equality claim. In the fourth wave, the 
centrality of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms was highlighted. In the 
fifth phase, there is a holistic approach that builds on the previous phrases. Thus, 
access to justice is now conceived of as substantive justice, procedural fairness, 
and equal access to institutions.  The general strategy has centered on providing 
access to legal institutions, legal education, the judiciary, and public institutions 
for the historically excluded. Through the different stages, two basic strands of 
the access to justice strategy can be articulated: a multidimensional approach to 
access to justice and a legal pluralistic understanding of where law is produced, 
applied, and enforced.146  
 
Using these two strategies as the backdrop, I argue that the mass human 
rights atrocities in Sri Lanka can be handled through these two legal techniques 
as an alternative to the calls for the creation of an international mechanism to 
prosecute those responsible for mass human rights violations. The 
multidimensional strategy vis-à-vis accountability for mass human rights 
violations suggests that there must be an emphasis on domestic access to courts 
and other available tools. For example, the Sri Lankan judiciary has a robust 
history of adjudicating violations of fundamental rights for its citizens, especially 
from minority communities. Since the start of the conflict, local lawyers have 
been fast at work in bringing habeas corpus motions to the courts as a reaction 
to the draconian implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1978) and 
the Emergency Regulations147. For example, in Nallaratnam Singarasa v. 
Attorney General,148, local legal advocates challenged the unconstitutional nature 
of the detention, torture, and forced confession of the applicant. Even though the 
Sri Lankan courts were not sympathetic to the applicant’s claims, this particular 	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case brought international attention to the GoSL’s position, especially after the 
dubious and unprecedented move by the Sri Lankan Supreme Court to render 
the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights unconstitutional.149   A similar case was before the Sri Lankan 
Supreme Court where the applicant was tortured and murdered whilst in 
detention as result of prison riots.150 Granted, the recent impeachment of the 
Chief Justice and numerous corruption claims against the judiciary loom over any 
calls to strengthen the domestic judiciary.151  
 
Nonetheless, emphasis must be made to secure the de-politicization of the Sri 
Lankan judiciary and the legal profession. It should be emphasized that I am in 
no way suggesting the rule of law type model that is pervasive in the law and 
development discourse at the moment. Such an initiative can be gleaned through 
donor agencies policies (World Bank for example) to strengthen local 
governance through economic and structural reforms.152 The access to justice 
model advocated here however centers on providing access to legal institutions, 
legal education, the judiciary, and public institutions for the marginalized. It 
specially moves away from a top down process (imposition of rule of law from 
Western donors) to one that is much more holistic with an emphasis on 
grassroots mobilization. 
 
Adopting an access to justice lens will require a holistic approach to how Sri 
Lanka’s justice systems functions. There should be an emphasis on holding the 
judiciary and the state apparatus to account, whilst simultaneously providing the 
required training and legal education to judges and legal professionals. Local 
participants (all sections of the Sri Lankan polity) should encourage reforms to 
the existing structures to provide legal aid and re-conceptualize the legal claims 
based on discrimination on race, ethnicity and equality. Alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms (as mediation and other forms of negotiation) should be 
fostered and encouraged.  
 
Simultaneously, and as an ancillary process, an access to justice approach 
would encourage the utilization of existing international institutions to promote an 
accountability agenda.153 For example, Sri Lanka is party to numerous 
international conventions with specialized monitoring bodies, such as the 	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monitoring body of the Convention Against Torture. Local NGOs and individuals 
should submit complaints to these existing international institutions. This should 
not be seen as a legal act to access justice, but as a political act of lobbying with 
the potential of creating an international record154. Other international institutions 
such as the International Criminal Court should be utilized as means to gain 
leverage against the GoSL and its officials. For example, Union of the Comoros 
recently filed a complaint with respect to the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the 
Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip. Comoros requested the 
Prosecutor of the ICC pursuant to Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Rome Statute “to 
initiate an investigation into the crimes committed within the Court’s jurisdiction, 
arising from this raid”. Such an international strategy is available to accountability 
seeking groups such as the Tamil Diaspora. The international community can 
play a pivotal role in supporting local stakeholders, through, for example, grants, 
contributions, and educational opportunities for local experts to gain access to 
new knowledge fields,, in securing such an access to justice model. Moreover, 
the international community can and should utilize existing tools, such as the 
referral mechanism within the ICC, as a way to leverage Sri Lanka’s compliance 
with an access to justice policy to strengthen domestic institutions.   
5 Conclusion 
My research and legal practice are informed and inspired by the lived 
experiences of the people of the Global South, prompting an increased 
collaboration between legal scholars and anthropologists, historians, political 
scientists and sociologists.  A special aspect of this research is its emphasis on 
interdisciplinarity and empiricism.  This approach is inspired by the literature 
(such as the works of Patricia J. Williams and David B. Wilkins155) that uses 
personal stories and narratives to describe, understand, and theorize its subject 
position vis-à-vis its field of study.  I am simultaneously committed to the 
methodologies associated with the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) movement(s) that seek to unpack, deconstruct and then reconstruct 
international law.   
 
In this context, this paper examined the UN Expert Panel’s recommendation for 
the establishment of an independent international mechanism to monitor the Sri 
Lankan Government’s initiation of an accountability proceeding, to investigate the 
alleged violations, and to collect data was taken as the foil to discuss some of the 
critical ramifications of creating an international criminal institution for Sri Lanka. 
This chapter has demonstrated that international criminal justice is fraught with 	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controversies and may not yield the optimum result in confronting past and on-
going human rights violations.  
 
This paper argued that the access to justice literature may open up new vistas as 
to how to manage past mass atrocities. The existing literature on transitional 
justice has alluded to the benefits of adopting a holistic multidimensional 
approach to dealing with past atrocities. Taking my cue from those critical of 
existing attempts to “end impunity”, I have preliminarily advocated for an access 
to justice model.   Such an approach necessitates that we turn to existing 
domestic mechanisms and strengthen the judiciary, legal profession, and legal 
education, for example. More importantly, ‘we’ must adopt multidimensional 
strategies and recognize that law can be produced within multiple milieus. These 
are but a starting point in thinking through different transitional justice 
mechanisms.  
 
I have argued for such a perspective based on my professional experience of 
working in the North and East of Sri Lanka. The conflict has had disastrous 
effects on the Tamil population; they have been shut out of the various 
conversations about governance generally for the last 27 years. Moreover pro-
nationalist agenda emphasis has shifted the focus away from the needs of the 
community (vis-à-vis education, health care, access to institutions) to one that is 
based on an illusory rights claim (i.e. discrimination). The rights based approach 
is part and parcel of the top down spread of international law and international 
human rights law, fostered and promoted by the NGO elites in Colombo and 
abroad who lack real connections to those that are affected on the ground. I rely 
on the access to justice model as a possibility of turning back to the communities 
that have suffered from the onslaught of the civil war, both in the North and East 
and in the West and South and allowing them to decide their own future.    
